7 Urgent Reasons Why Defending Iran Is Asia’s Existential Imperative Against Rising Western Aggression

7 Urgent Reasons Why Defending Iran Is Asia’s Existential Imperative Against Rising Western Aggression

The Strategic Earthquake in West Asia and Its Immediate Epicenters

A New Phase of Destabilisation

The ongoing Israeli offensive against Iran, encapsulated under the name “Operation Rising Lion,” has rapidly escalated from targeted strikes to a sustained campaign of militarized destabilisation, impacting nuclear, military, and civilian infrastructure deep within Iranian territory. This development marks a historic watershed—one not seen since the Iran-Iraq War—in terms of the scale and scope of foreign military aggression against Iran. More than a simple tactical or preemptive operation, these attacks reflect Israel’s broader intent to permanently degrade Iran’s strategic autonomy and regional influence, while simultaneously defying international law and undermining the sovereignty of a UN member state.

This assault coincides with Israel’s ongoing campaign in Gaza, expanding regional hostilities to include Lebanon and Syria. It thus represents not merely a localized flare-up but a pivot towards sustained regional confrontation with ripple effects destined to reshape South and Central Asia, the Eurasian corridor, and the broader Global South. These impacts are especially acute for Pakistan—a nation intimately linked to Iran through geography, historical cooperation, and strategic interdependence. More broadly, the war has exposed the structural fragility of emergent counter-hegemonic coalitions like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which are now being tested on their capacity to respond to a rapidly deteriorating multipolar order.

Section 1: Iran’s Strategic Irreplaceability in the Global South

Iran has consistently positioned itself as the Middle East’s sole non-aligned state with the capacity to resist U.S. and Israeli influence without reliance on external patrons. Unlike the Gulf monarchies, whose security is deeply intertwined with U.S. military logistics and bases, Iran has pursued an indigenous defence doctrine. Despite enduring one of the longest-standing U.S. sanctions regimes, it has sustained an economy that is significantly more resilient than many of the highly indebted developing countries today. Tehran’s refusal to seek assistance from the IMF or World Bank and its attempt to create alternative financing channels have underscored a broader strategy of economic self-reliance and anti-imperialist resilience.

Iran’s autonomous posture holds particular significance in a region otherwise populated by client states and externally managed actors. The mere existence of a functional state system in Tehran that is not subservient to U.S. dictates holds symbolic and strategic value for anti-hegemonic movements across Asia, Latin America, and Africa. In short, Iran is not only geopolitically strategic—it is ideologically irreplaceable for the Global South’s aspirations for an equitable global order.

Section 2: The Fragile Equilibrium in Iran-Pakistan Relations

Despite ideological tensions—primarily centered around the Shia-Sunni divide and external manipulation by Saudi Arabia and the U.S.—Iran and Pakistan have managed to preserve a complex yet functional relationship. Both countries share a 900-kilometre border that necessitates pragmatic engagement, especially concerning border security, energy trade, and counter-terrorism cooperation.

While geopolitical events—such as Pakistan’s alignment with Saudi Arabia, or Iran’s ambiguous relationship with India—have strained bilateral trust, certain projects like the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline demonstrate an underlying structural interdependence. Even informal trade networks, accounting for up to $6 billion annually, form a crucial economic lifeline, especially in the energy-starved Pakistani province of Baluchistan.

Yet, this equilibrium is perilously fragile. The January 2024 border airstrikes between the two nations underscore the potential for miscalculation. Should Iran be engulfed in internal disorder or replaced by a hostile, Israel-aligned regime, Pakistan would lose a strategic buffer against Gulf Wahhabism and face a significantly more complex security environment. The possibility of an Israeli-influenced government in Tehran would fundamentally alter Pakistan’s threat matrix, introducing an existential security dilemma.

Section 3: The Nuclear Triangle and Escalatory Precedents

The Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities have broken what little remained of the norm against attacking a nuclear programme of a sovereign state. This sets an ominous precedent for South Asia, where India and Pakistan maintain an uneasy nuclear détente. If the bombing of enrichment plants is normalized under the logic of preventive warfare, the very foundations of Pakistan’s deterrence doctrine could be destabilized.

Moreover, a retaliatory acceleration in Iran’s nuclear ambitions may prompt the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to reassert their shadow arrangements with Pakistan. This longstanding but opaque relationship has led to speculation that Riyadh views Pakistan as a potential nuclear umbrella. Under pressure, Islamabad could be forced into a strategic corner—choosing between preserving its relationship with Iran or acceding to the demands of Gulf clients.

This triangular strategic complexity risks plunging South Asia into an unpredictable cycle of nuclear brinkmanship, eroding the taboos that have kept large-scale war at bay since the 1998 nuclear tests.

Section 4: China, BRI, and the Eurasian Arc

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has made Iran indispensable to China’s vision of a unified Eurasian economy. With deep investments in Iranian oil, digital infrastructure, and transportation corridors, China views Iran as a strategic node in the West Asian segment of BRI. Iran also anchors the Iran-Russia-China trilateral axis, which serves as a counterweight to U.S.-led alliances such as NATO and AUKUS.

For Pakistan, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—the flagship project of BRI—runs through Baluchistan, an area that would be directly impacted by instability in Iran. Cross-border insurgencies, drug trafficking, and refugee flows could derail not only CPEC but China’s broader regional ambitions. The loss of Iran as a stabilizing force would thus be a direct blow to Beijing’s strategic depth and its pursuit of regional influence through economic integration.

Section 5: Macroeconomic Fallout Across Asia

Oil markets responded to the initial Israeli strikes with a sharp price hike of 7–11%, but analysts warn that this is only the beginning. A serious disruption to the Strait of Hormuz—through which one-third of global oil passes—would precipitate a price shock rivaling the 1970s oil crisis. Unlike the past, however, alternative sources and reserves are less accessible, with OPEC+ nearing capacity and U.S. shale production plateauing.

For Asia, the fallout would be catastrophic. Pakistan—already operating under an IMF austerity programme—would face an impossible choice between maintaining fuel subsidies or risking mass unrest. Its informal energy imports from Iran, estimated at $1–2 billion annually, have functioned as a shadow subsidy. The collapse of this channel would create fiscal chaos, stagflation, and political instability.

India, though benefiting from discounted Russian crude, would see its shipping costs skyrocket as sea routes circumvent the Persian Gulf. Inflation could rise by 2%, eroding rural purchasing power and spiking input costs for sectors like agriculture and textiles. China’s industrial slowdown would deepen, with refining operations facing bottlenecks due to the absence of compatible crude blends from Iran.

These disruptions would not remain confined to oil. Petrochemical chains, fertilizer inputs, and maritime insurance costs would trigger knock-on effects across Asia’s industrial heartlands—from Vietnam’s garment sector to Bangladesh’s fertilizer-dependent agrarian economy.

BRICS Fragmentation, Monetary Reversal, and the Ideological Vacuum of a Fallen Iran

Section 6: Fractures Within the BRICS+ Bloc

The Israel-Iran crisis has laid bare serious structural contradictions within the BRICS bloc. While China and Russia have strongly condemned Israeli aggression, India has refrained from any explicit rebuke. Instead, New Delhi has continued its deepening defence and intelligence ties with Israel. This silence reflects not only India’s realpolitik considerations but also a shift towards ideological alignment with Zionist nationalism under the banner of Hindu majoritarianism.

This divergence undermines the fundamental premise of BRICS: that it offers a coherent, multilateral alternative to Western-led global governance. If member states cannot articulate a unified response to violations of international law, especially one involving an emerging BRICS+ partner like Iran, the bloc risks being perceived as toothless. Iran, invited into BRICS+ only recently, now faces existential threats without clear support from the coalition. The absence of economic, diplomatic, or even rhetorical backing shatters the illusion of South-South solidarity that BRICS has sought to cultivate.

This splintering has material consequences. In an environment of strategic uncertainty, financial flows to the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB) may dry up, especially from sovereign wealth funds that prioritize stability. Development finance projects in Latin America, Africa, and Central Asia will stall, as BRICS credibility erodes and emerging markets hedge back towards Western financial instruments.

Section 7: The Collapse of De-Dollarisation Efforts

One of BRICS’ core goals in recent years has been to establish a multipolar financial order independent of the U.S. dollar. Initiatives such as China’s digital yuan, the Russia-India rupee-ruble exchange, and gold-backed trading mechanisms were all seen as tools for bypassing Western sanctions and enabling local currency trade.

However, the Iran crisis has exposed the fragility of this movement. As oil markets tighten and volatility spikes, many BRICS countries will be forced to revert to dollar-denominated trade to maintain energy security. This rollback is not only tactical—it is systemic. Energy commodities remain priced in dollars due to deep liquidity, derivatives coverage, and petro-benchmark stability. When oil markets enter panic mode, liquidity flows toward the greenback.

China’s yuan, while increasingly internationalized, still lacks the deep financial ecosystem necessary to underwrite emergency liquidity. India’s rupee, as evidenced in 2022 when the rupee-ruble mechanism collapsed under pressure, remains vulnerable to speculative attack during crises. Even Russia’s ruble, heavily sanctioned, cannot function as a reliable energy currency.

This forced return to the dollar market will derail plans for a BRICS reserve currency. It also renders BRICS’ claim to financial sovereignty hollow. Worse, it strengthens the hand of the U.S. Federal Reserve and Treasury, enabling Washington to weaponize the dollar with renewed impunity.

Section 8: Strategic Vacuum and the Ghost of Post-Ottoman Collapse

The destruction or partition of Iran would not merely eliminate a regional power. It would create an ideological vacuum akin to the post-Ottoman collapse in the early 20th century. Then, as now, the disintegration of a pluralist imperial polity created space for colonial mandates, client regimes, and ethno-sectarian fragmentation. The result was the long arc of underdevelopment, foreign occupation, and Western-sponsored authoritarianism that has plagued the Middle East for a century.

Today, Iran serves as the last coherent regional power in West Asia with an autonomous foreign policy. Its collapse would invite a repeat of the post-Ottoman model: occupation cloaked as stabilization, puppet governance justified through humanitarian rhetoric, and foreign military bases enshrined as permanent fixtures of the regional security architecture.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), for all its domestic repression, represents one of the few non-NATO-aligned military institutions in the region. Its destruction would leave a vacuum quickly filled by Saudi-aligned paramilitaries, Israeli intelligence networks, or even jihadist spillovers. Such an outcome would not only destabilize the region but also permanently shift the strategic balance in favour of U.S.-Israeli primacy.

Section 9: Preventing Protectorate Politics in Iran

There are legitimate concerns that the Israeli campaign is designed to pave the way for regime change under the guise of security intervention. This could take the form of a “protectorate” arrangement in which a new Iranian government is installed with heavy foreign tutelage. Israeli or Western military presence on Iranian soil—permanent or rotational—would be framed as necessary to ensure stability and prevent nuclear proliferation.

However, the geopolitical implications of such an arrangement are explosive. For China and Russia, it would represent the final encirclement of Eurasia, completing a strategic arc from Eastern Europe through the Caucasus and Central Asia. For Pakistan, it would mean a hostile, externally-managed regime on its southwestern flank—compounding the already complex India-Afghanistan front.

Turkey, too, would find itself boxed in. Despite its occasional ambivalence toward Iran, Ankara views any Israeli-American base in Iran as an existential threat to its regional aspirations. Turkey would be rendered geopolitically irrelevant, unable to shape outcomes in Syria, Iraq, or the Caucasus.

Preventing this scenario demands urgent diplomatic intervention. Regional mechanisms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) must coordinate to ensure that Iranian sovereignty is not eviscerated under the logic of stabilization.

Section 10: Collective Security Architecture for the Global South

The current crisis underscores the need for a new collective security framework in the Global South. Institutions like the SCO and BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) must move beyond rhetorical posturing and establish operational protocols for regional crisis management.

For example, the SCO could deploy a tripartite border force to stabilize Iran’s periphery with Pakistan and Afghanistan. The OIC could mobilize an Islamic Development Bank (IDB) emergency fund to support Iranian food and medicine imports, circumventing Western sanctions. BRICS+ could activate a financial shield through the CRA to stabilize currencies in crisis-hit nations like Pakistan or Turkey.

Such initiatives would not only protect Iran’s territorial integrity but also reaffirm the Global South’s commitment to sovereignty, non-alignment, and regional self-determination. Without these mechanisms, Global South nations will remain reactive rather than proactive—forever victims of externally driven chaos.

Section 11: Protecting South-South Trade and Food Security

The destabilization of Iran threatens critical trade corridors that sustain food and commodity flows from Central Asia to East Africa. Iran functions as a transit hub for Russian wheat exports bound for Africa and the Middle East. A breakdown in this corridor could precipitate food insecurity from Cairo to Karachi.

Pakistan is particularly vulnerable. Nearly 15% of its wheat and fertiliser imports depend on Iranian transit routes. Should these be disrupted, rural inflation would spike, triggering unrest in Punjab and Sindh. Bangladesh, too, could see food inflation rise if Iranian ports fall offline.

Preemptive action is needed. Multilateral food reserves, backed by the Islamic Development Bank or BRICS development funds, must be mobilized. Stockpiling, strategic procurement, and humanitarian corridors through neutral countries like Turkmenistan and Oman could prevent famine-scale crises.

Moreover, digital platforms—like blockchain-based commodity tracking—could be employed to bypass sanctions and ensure real-time inventory management of critical supplies across the South.

Post-War Reconstruction, Refugee Spillovers, and the Race to Stabilize West Asia

Section 12: The Prospects and Perils of Post-War Reconstruction

If Israel’s Operation Rising Lion succeeds in crippling Iran’s military-industrial capacity, the world will face the gargantuan task of post-war reconstruction in a nation of 88 million people. Rebuilding would require a scale of intervention unseen since the U.S. occupation of Iraq or the NATO campaign in Afghanistan—both widely viewed as failures that sowed long-term instability.

A fractured Iranian state, split between remnants of the Islamic Republic, opposition forces, foreign-backed militias, and transnational jihadist networks, would be vulnerable to decades of internal conflict. Unlike Syria or Iraq, Iran is a much larger, more urbanised and industrialised society. The loss of central governance could result in cascading administrative failures: power blackouts, water shortages, urban collapse, and public health crises.

Multilateral institutions are ill-prepared. The UN has little capacity to deploy reconstruction frameworks under active bombardment, while Western agencies—tainted by their roles in regime change—would be treated with suspicion. China and Russia, though capable, would be hesitant to invest in an environment of military occupation or political fragmentation. Thus, reconstruction may be shaped more by foreign political agendas than local recovery.

Section 13: Refugees, Statelessness, and Spillover Instability

The humanitarian impact would not be contained within Iran. Estimates suggest up to 10 million Iranians could be displaced in a worst-case collapse, overwhelming neighbouring countries and UNHCR facilities. Pakistan, already hosting millions of Afghan refugees, would be the first and most vulnerable recipient of these flows.

Refugee influxes would exacerbate existing sectarian and ethnic tensions in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Iran’s diverse demographic—Baluch, Azeri, Kurdish, Arab, and Persian populations—could reshape regional identity politics as groups flee and attempt to settle in historically tense areas.

In Turkey, new refugee flows would compound the Syrian crisis, stoking domestic unrest and anti-immigrant sentiment. Iraq, already brittle, could see Shia militias assert cross-border operations, further destabilizing its western and southern provinces.

Transnational jihadist networks could exploit this chaos. The collapse of the IRGC’s internal security functions would open up space for ISIS, Al-Qaeda remnants, or newly formed radical entities to seize territory and establish training hubs. This is particularly dangerous for Central Asia, where borders are porous and institutions are weak.

Section 14: Pakistan’s Security Dilemma in the Post-Iran Landscape

Pakistan’s internal security apparatus would face a multi-front crisis. Refugee flows would strain infrastructure and social cohesion. Simultaneously, the vacuum left by Iranian counter-terrorism agencies on the border would increase the threat of cross-border arms trafficking, narco-financing, and militant infiltration.

More dangerously, Pakistan could become the next frontline state in the regional confrontation. Saudi Arabia and the UAE might pressure Islamabad to militarise its border or deploy troops in Baluchistan to “secure” Sunni refugee populations or energy routes. Meanwhile, anti-Shia groups within Pakistan could be emboldened, creating sectarian fault lines in Karachi, Quetta, and Parachinar.

Internally, the economic burden of hosting millions more refugees—combined with a potential halt in subsidized Iranian fuel—would likely collapse Pakistan’s IMF arrangements. This would force Islamabad into a fiscal abyss, with rising defence costs, falling revenues, and an uncontrollable current account deficit.

Section 15: Strategic Realignment in Regional Diplomacy

The Iran-Israel conflict is also catalyzing a regional reshuffle in diplomatic alignments. Countries that were previously hedging between powers may now be forced to choose sides. The Abraham Accords bloc—comprising the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and increasingly Saudi Arabia—will likely harden in support of Israel. Meanwhile, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon may be drawn deeper into Iran’s orbit if Tehran survives in a diminished form.

Turkey’s ambiguous role is set to become more complex. Ankara, despite its rivalry with Iran, does not benefit from a Western military footprint on its southern border. President Erdogan may leverage the crisis to reassert Turkish influence in the Caucasus, Iraq, and Central Asia, exploiting the void left by Iran’s retreat.

India faces a dual imperative: preserving its energy security while maintaining defence cooperation with Israel. Delhi’s tilt toward Tel Aviv may bring short-term defence dividends but risks undermining its access to West Asian markets and alienating traditional partners like Iran and even sections of the Arab world.

Section 16: The Future of Global Energy in a Post-Iran Order

Iran’s removal from global energy markets would have generational consequences. With 13% of global oil reserves and significant natural gas holdings, Iran plays a crucial role in balancing markets during supply shocks. If permanently sidelined, the world will see the return of a high-price, low-reserve paradigm.

OPEC+ may struggle to fill the vacuum. Spare capacity in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is limited, and Venezuelan and Libyan supplies remain volatile. U.S. shale producers cannot respond quickly due to underinvestment and environmental opposition. Thus, prices could remain elevated for years.

Strategically, countries may pivot to long-term LNG infrastructure, with Qatar and Australia becoming dominant. However, this transition requires 5–10 years of investment. In the short term, energy poverty may rise across the Global South, and inflationary pressures will reverse gains made in post-pandemic recovery.

Nuclear energy may experience a renaissance, but proliferation risks will rise. If Iran’s nuclear ambitions are violently curtailed, other states may accelerate their covert programs under the rationale that possession, not aspiration, is the only deterrent to preemption.

Section 17: The Urgency of a Global South Security Framework

In the face of cascading failures, the Global South must reassess its strategic posture. The BRICS and SCO blocs, despite their limitations, offer frameworks for collective resilience. However, they must transition from reactive clubs to proactive security mechanisms.

Options include:

• Establishing a BRICS Peacekeeping Corps for non-aligned conflict zones
• Creating a South-South Humanitarian Corridor Management Authority
• Fast-tracking a BRICS+ Sovereign Energy Fund to support energy-deficient states
• Formalizing inter-regional food reserve compacts through the African Union, ASEAN, and SAARC

Moreover, diplomatic efforts must be coordinated. Iran’s situation could be used to demand reforms in the UN Security Council, particularly to challenge the impunity of permanent members who violate sovereignty norms.

Section 18: Mapping the Insurgency Risks Across Iran and Beyond

In the aftermath of an Israeli assault capable of degrading Iran’s state structure, a proliferation of insurgent actors is a near certainty. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), long a stabilising if controversial force in Iranian domestic affairs, is the glue holding together vast border provinces and sectarian fault lines. Without it, longstanding grievances will erupt.

Key flashpoints include:

• Khuzestan Province: Ethnic Arab populations, historically marginalised and economically neglected, may rise in secessionist revolt. Supported covertly by Gulf states, this region—home to significant oil reserves—will become a contested geopolitical prize.
• Sistan-Baluchistan: Already a zone of cross-border trafficking and militancy, this eastern region would become a staging ground for Sunni insurgents backed by external actors hostile to Iran’s Shia identity.
• Kurdistan (Western Iran): Kurdish nationalist movements, inspired by gains in Syria and Iraq, may escalate their calls for autonomy or independence. Armed groups like PJAK and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (KFLP) could intensify operations, possibly coordinated with U.S. or Israeli intelligence.

These insurgencies will not remain confined to Iranian borders. Pakistan’s Baluchistan would become both a recruitment ground and a transit corridor. Afghan territory, under Taliban control but with its own vulnerabilities, might host training camps for Sunni factions, further complicating regional security.

Section 19: Scenarios for Political Survival or Transformation in Iran

Despite the military aggression, the Iranian regime’s collapse is not guaranteed. Multiple internal scenarios may unfold:

1. Centralised Retrenchment: The IRGC may consolidate power, possibly sidelining or removing clerical leadership. Iran would shift towards a military-technocratic model, with the Supreme Leader’s role diminished or ceremonial.
2. Fragmented Sovereignty: Tehran maintains control over urban centers and vital infrastructure, but loses effective sovereignty in peripheral provinces. In this scenario, Iran resembles Syria post-2013: a mosaic of state and non-state actors, some aligned with foreign patrons.
3. Exile Government & Civil Resistance: Diaspora-led opposition may attempt to create a government-in-exile, supported by Western capitals. However, its domestic legitimacy would be low unless civil society within Iran—particularly the student movement, unions, and urban intelligentsia—coalesce into a democratic front.
4. Foreign-Managed Transition: An externally imposed interim administration, possibly under UN or U.S. stewardship, seeks to stabilise Iran. Historically, such arrangements—be it in Iraq or Libya—have lacked durability and public trust.

Each scenario carries implications for regional security, with the potential to either stabilize or fracture the geopolitical landscape of West and South Asia.

Section 20: The Political Weaponisation of the Iranian Diaspora

The global Iranian diaspora, numbering over 4 million across North America, Europe, and the Gulf, is poised to play a significant role in shaping narratives and policy. Historically fragmented between monarchists, reformists, and socialists, the diaspora is now being courted by Western governments and media to legitimise interventionist strategies.

Think tanks and political lobbies like the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK) have already increased their media footprint. Simultaneously, independent intellectuals and exile journalists are demanding humanitarian aid and non-military support for civil resistance.

This contest over legitimacy—whether the voice of Iran’s future lies in military-backed exiles or grassroots democratic resistance—will shape how the international community frames the post-war order. It also risks fueling diaspora fragmentation, as competing groups receive differential recognition and funding.

Pakistan and India, home to Shia scholarly communities and student populations, will also feel the resonance of diaspora-driven ideological polarization. Sectarian narratives amplified abroad will feed back into domestic politics, influencing youth radicalisation, communal politics, and foreign policy debates.

Section 21: Institutional Paralysis and the Collapse of Normative Order

The inability of international institutions to prevent or even meaningfully respond to Israel’s attack on Iran has shredded the last vestiges of post-WWII legal architecture. The UN Security Council, paralyzed by U.S. vetoes, has issued no resolution. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been sidelined, unable to protect its facilities or staff inside Iran. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has not opened a preliminary inquiry despite clear violations of the UN Charter.

This paralysis feeds a dangerous precedent: powerful states may now pursue military campaigns under the cover of existential security claims without institutional censure. It normalizes preventive war, pre-emptive strikes, and regime change without accountability.

For the Global South, this exposes the hollowness of the international legal regime. Countries such as Pakistan, Brazil, Nigeria, and Indonesia—who have historically relied on multilateral institutions for diplomatic balance—must now confront a stark reality: sovereignty is only protected by deterrence or alliance, not law.

The WTO, too, will be affected. Sanctions on Iranian trade partners and energy rerouting will generate disputes over maritime logistics, insurance, and third-party trade retaliation. With the Appellate Body of the WTO already weakened, dispute resolution may collapse, returning global trade to a state of bilateralism and economic nationalism.

Section 22: Militarisation of Development Finance

Another consequence of the Iran crisis will be the increasing securitisation of global development finance. Institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, under U.S. influence, may introduce new conditionalities to recipient states, including security cooperation clauses, regional alignment requirements, and anti-China provisions.

For countries like Pakistan and Egypt—heavily indebted and geopolitically vulnerable—this will result in a loss of policy autonomy. Defence and intelligence collaboration with Western powers may become prerequisites for debt restructuring. Already, IMF negotiations with Pakistan involve military budget oversight, a precedent likely to be extended.

BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB) and China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) face a test: whether they can offer credible, unconditional alternatives or whether they too will be forced into political criteria in lending, especially if Western sanctions spill over.

Section 23: Russia’s Strategic Recalibration and the Eurasian Imperative

As Israel’s Operation Rising Lion unfolds and Iran’s sovereignty hangs in the balance, Russia’s position in the emerging global order becomes increasingly precarious. Despite being a major power with significant regional stakes, Moscow finds itself constrained—embroiled in the Ukraine conflict, burdened by sanctions, and facing the limits of overstretched diplomacy.

Russia’s principal interest in Iran lies in maintaining a buffer against NATO-aligned militarisation of West Asia. Iran functions as the cornerstone of Russia’s southern strategic depth. The possibility of U.S. or Israeli bases in post-conflict Iran would place hostile forces at the doorstep of the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia—regions where Moscow has long wielded influence.

Moscow’s recalibration may take several forms:

• Increased Arms Transfers: With formal constraints discarded, Russia may accelerate the delivery of advanced air defence systems (e.g., S-400 variants) to allies in West Asia, including Syria, Iraq, and even Turkey.
• Expanded CSTO Mandate: The Collective Security Treaty Organization could be repurposed to function beyond post-Soviet borders, potentially offering security guarantees to new strategic partners like Iran or Armenia.
• Pipeline Diplomacy Acceleration: The urgency to bypass vulnerable routes through Iran may push Moscow to fast-track energy corridors through the Black Sea, Turkey, or the Arctic.

Section 24: China’s West Asia Doctrine: Between Commerce and Conflict

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) runs directly through Iranian territory, making Tehran’s destabilisation a blow to Beijing’s ambitions for Eurasian integration. Beijing’s historical approach to West Asia has been one of strategic non-intervention—economic presence without entanglement. However, the collapse of Iran challenges this principle.

China’s recalibration is unfolding along three axes:

• Strategic Balancing: Beijing is intensifying its diplomatic engagement with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, seeking to hedge against regional polarisation. Simultaneously, it maintains channels with Iran and Turkey, aiming to mediate rather than choose sides.
• Security Infrastructure Investments: Recent proposals for joint naval drills with Gulf nations and increased satellite surveillance over maritime chokepoints indicate a willingness to build harder security assets in the region.
• Yuan Diplomacy Revisited: As energy volatility rises, China may redouble efforts to push the yuan as a transactional currency, particularly in long-term LNG and arms deals with OPEC+ members, thereby reducing its exposure to U.S. dollar fluctuations.

China’s broader challenge will be to preserve its image as a neutral peacemaker while protecting its vast logistical, financial, and infrastructural interests in a rapidly militarising environment.

Section 25: GCC Bloc Fragmentation and Realignment

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), traditionally viewed as a unified Arab front, is undergoing internal fragmentation. While the UAE and Bahrain have embraced normalization with Israel, Kuwait and Qatar maintain varying degrees of caution. Saudi Arabia, though inching closer to Tel Aviv, remains deeply ambivalent about openly endorsing Israel’s assault on Iran.

Two major fault lines have emerged:

• Security Orientation: While the UAE and Bahrain are aligning more explicitly with Israel and Western militaries, Oman and Qatar prefer regional de-escalation. This divergence complicates GCC joint command structures and military standardisation.
• Economic Vulnerabilities: Smaller states like Bahrain and Oman, heavily reliant on Iran-linked trade routes and port cooperation, fear the long-term effects of regional isolation. Their dependence on transhipment and maritime trade makes instability unsustainable.

The post-Iran era could see the formal splitting of the GCC into two competing blocs: a pro-Israel, security-forward alliance led by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, and a diplomatic neutrality camp rooted in Doha, Muscat, and potentially a recalibrated Kuwait.

Section 26: UN, G20, and Institutional Reform in Crisis Response

The Iranian crisis has exposed the weaknesses of global institutions in managing aggression, preserving peace, and regulating the conduct of powerful states. The UN Security Council’s structural paralysis—primarily due to the veto system—has rendered it irrelevant in the eyes of much of the Global South.

The G20, which includes Iran’s attackers and defenders, has likewise remained silent. Its economic coordination mandate appears insufficient in the face of a geopolitical emergency with direct consequences for global energy and food security.

Reform proposals gaining traction include:

• A New Peace Council: Proposed by South Africa and Brazil, this council would function as an emergency response unit within the UN, composed of non-permanent elected states from each continent, with binding arbitration powers during state-on-state violence.
• G20+ Emergency Coordination Mechanism: A working group for energy and refugee shocks, co-chaired by two G20 members and one BRICS+ nation, designed to rapidly mobilize food, energy, and liquidity buffers.
• Decentralised Humanitarian Oversight: Advocates suggest transferring humanitarian coordination from UN agencies to regional organisations—e.g., ASEAN, AU, or SAARC—better positioned to understand local dynamics.

Section 27: Envisioning a Future Multipolar Order

With the institutional failures laid bare by the Iran conflict, the question now arises: can the world still move toward a stable multipolarity, or are we entering an age of competitive imperial spheres?

The future of multipolarity will hinge on:

• Interregional Coalition Building: Cross-continental alliances—such as Africa-Latin America economic corridors or ASEAN-GCC digital trade agreements—could help break dependency on superpower structures.
• Multilateral Strategic Autonomy Pacts: New blocs may emerge around specific capacities—space, AI, energy, and food—each with a diverse governance model. These would be flexible, overlapping alliances rather than rigid Cold War-style camps.
• Institutional Innovation: Countries like Indonesia, Brazil, and South Africa are calling for the creation of Global South-led institutions in dispute resolution, development finance, and cyber diplomacy—parallel to, not within, existing Western-dominated regimes.

Iran’s fate will become a test case. If its sovereignty is erased without consequence, multipolarity will be revealed as a rhetorical aspiration rather than a political reality. Conversely, coordinated Global South resistance and institution-building could turn the current tragedy into a foundational moment.

Conclusion: Strategic Unity or Permanent Subjugation?

The collapse of Iran, engineered or accidental, offers the Global South a clear binary: unite to defend sovereignty, economic justice, and strategic autonomy—or remain perpetually vulnerable to the whims of empire.

From Islamabad to Brasília, from Johannesburg to Jakarta, a common cause is emerging. Whether it can translate into operational unity, policy coordination, and strategic resilience will determine whether multipolarity survives the 21st century—or dies with the last independent state of West Asia.

(End of Part 5)

Parts 1 through 5 now constitute a professional, full-length editorial analysis of Israel’s Operation Rising Lion and its systemic consequences for Iran, Pakistan, and the entire Global South. Follow-up parts can explore humanitarian aid frameworks, cyber warfare spillovers, or South-South reconstruction planning.

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