Myanmar Junta’s High-Risk Pivot: From Battlefield to Ballots, 5 Major Obstacles Threaten 2025 Polls

Myanmar junta shifts from battlefield to ballots, but 5 major challenges make elections a risky gamble amid ongoing conflict and instability

Myanmar’s ruling military junta is attempting a high-stakes political pivot—from relentless battlefield offensives to a renewed focus on elections—but analysts warn the move faces formidable challenges amid deepening conflict, widespread resistance, and a severe legitimacy crisis. Nearly four years after seizing power in a coup that plunged the country into chaos, the generals are now presenting ballots as a pathway to stability. Yet for many inside and outside Myanmar, the strategy appears fraught with risks and unlikely to deliver the political control the junta seeks.

The Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, overthrew the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in February 2021, triggering nationwide protests that were met with a violent crackdown. What began as civil disobedience soon escalated into a multi-front armed resistance involving ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and newly formed People’s Defence Forces (PDFs).

Since then, Myanmar has effectively descended into a protracted civil war. Entire regions have slipped out of junta control, infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed, and millions have been displaced. According to international observers, the military now faces its most serious internal challenge in decades, with coordinated offensives by resistance groups eroding its territorial dominance.

Against this backdrop, the military leadership has revived its promise of elections as part of what it calls a “roadmap to disciplined democracy.” Junta chief Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly claimed that polls will restore order and political normalcy. The election plan, expected to rely heavily on proportional representation, is widely seen as designed to fragment opposition forces and ensure military-aligned parties retain influence.

Analysts say the shift toward ballots reflects not confidence but strategic necessity. Battlefield losses, overstretched forces, economic decline, and growing diplomatic isolation have forced the junta to seek a political reset that could offer a veneer of legitimacy at home and abroad.

However, critics argue that elections under military rule—without genuine opposition participation—would be little more than a controlled exercise aimed at consolidating power rather than transferring it.

One of the most immediate hurdles facing the junta’s electoral ambitions is basic security. Large swathes of Myanmar are not under military control, including areas in Sagaing, Chin, Kachin, Kayah, and parts of Shan State. Resistance groups have repeatedly targeted military convoys, administrative offices, and election-related infrastructure.

Holding nationwide elections requires stable administration, voter registration, and secure polling stations—conditions that currently do not exist across much of the country. Even in urban centers, attacks and bombings have undermined the sense of safety needed for credible voting.

Political analysts note that an election conducted only in junta-controlled areas would lack both national representation and legitimacy, reinforcing perceptions that the process is deeply flawed.

Myanmar’s main opposition forces have categorically rejected the junta’s election plans. The National Unity Government (NUG), formed by ousted lawmakers and activists, has declared that any polls organized by the military will be illegitimate and has called on citizens to boycott them.

Many ethnic armed organizations have echoed this stance, arguing that elections without dialogue, federal reforms, or an end to military violence are meaningless. Civil society groups, student unions, and grassroots activists have also vowed to resist participation.

Public sentiment remains overwhelmingly hostile to the junta, particularly after years of airstrikes, village burnings, mass arrests, and reported human rights abuses. For many citizens, voting under military supervision is seen not as civic participation but as complicity.

Myanmar’s economy has suffered dramatically since the coup. Foreign investment has dried up, inflation has surged, and the currency has depreciated sharply. Power outages, fuel shortages, and rising unemployment have become routine.

This economic collapse poses another challenge to organizing elections. Administrative capacity has been weakened as civil servants joined the Civil Disobedience Movement or fled conflict zones. The costs of running elections—logistics, staffing, security—are substantial, and the junta’s financial resources are increasingly strained.

Without a functioning economy and effective governance, experts question whether the military can manage even the technical aspects of a national vote.

International reaction to the junta’s electoral plans has been largely skeptical. Western governments have dismissed the proposal as a sham, while the United Nations has repeatedly stressed that elections held under repression cannot be considered free or fair.

Even within Southeast Asia, patience is wearing thin. While ASEAN has maintained engagement under its Five-Point Consensus framework, progress toward peace has been minimal. Several ASEAN members have signaled that elections without inclusive dialogue will not resolve Myanmar’s crisis.

China and Russia, the junta’s key international backers, have adopted a more pragmatic stance, emphasizing stability over democratic norms. However, analysts say even these allies may view elections primarily as a tactical move rather than a genuine political solution.

Myanmar’s history offers cautionary lessons. The military-backed elections of 2010 were widely criticized but eventually led to a limited political opening. However, today’s context is vastly different. The scale of armed resistance, societal polarization, and economic collapse far exceeds anything seen during earlier transitions.

Moreover, the military’s credibility has been severely damaged since the coup. Trust between the generals and the public is virtually nonexistent, making it difficult to imagine elections serving as a bridge toward reconciliation.

Some analysts argue that the junta’s election push is less about winning legitimacy and more about buying time. By promising polls, the military may hope to ease international pressure, fracture opposition unity, and reframe the crisis as a political process rather than a civil war.

Others see the strategy as a gamble—an attempt to regain control through institutional means after failing to secure decisive battlefield victories. Yet the risks are significant. A poorly executed or widely boycotted election could further undermine the junta’s authority and embolden resistance forces.

As Myanmar’s conflict grinds on, the junta’s pivot from battlefield to ballots underscores the depth of the crisis rather than its resolution. Elections alone cannot address the country’s fundamental problems: military dominance, ethnic grievances, democratic aspirations, and widespread suffering.

Without an inclusive political dialogue, a cessation of violence, and meaningful reforms, analysts warn that elections may deepen divisions rather than heal them. For now, Myanmar remains trapped between war and an uncertain political future—where ballots, like bullets, are unlikely to bring peace on their own.

Myanmar Junta’s High-Risk Pivot: From Battlefield to Ballots, 5 Major Obstacles Threaten 2025 Polls